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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jay Johnson claimed that inappropriate languagecaused him to be intentionally or negligently
subjected to emotional distress by JCAV, LLC, (hereafter JCAV), through its agent, Mike McPhee.
Johnson also alleged that JCAV breached a contract to pay Johnson for work done as a real
estate agent, in procuring property for JCAV, and that part performance allowed the court to find
that, although there was no written agreement between the parties, Johnson was entitled to be paid.
Johnson also alleged that JCAV was negligent when it failed to investigate "allegations of
wanton behavior and breach of contract by McPhee."
In each Cause of Action the defendant, Mike McPhee, an individual, was named and JCAV
is named.

11. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The District Court Granted summary judgment to JCAV and McPhee.
This brief is filed on behalf of Respondent, JCAV, LLC.

111. SUMMARY OF FACTS
JCAV is a Washington limited liability company organized and registered to do business in
the State of Idaho. Jack VanderWaal is the sole member of JCAV. (R. Vol. I, p. 26)
Johnson's Complaint alleges that McPhee was an agent of JCAV and that in 2003 and again
in 2005, McPhee made certain comments, gestures, and sounds to Johnson which aggravated and
tormented Johnson and caused him to suffer humiliation, mental anguish, emotional and physical
distress which caused "Extreme Hardship, Severe Anxiety, Mental Disability." (R. Vol. I, p. 2).
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The words consisted of McPhee telling Johnson he was going to copulate with his girlfriend,
directing Johnson to bend over and let McPhee drive, asking Johnson to have oral sex, and then later,
in 2005 "verbal and textual taunting" and using undue influence to "subjugate" Johnson. He alleges
that this caused emotional distress. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 93-95).
There is no allegation that McPhee carried through with his intention with respect to
Johnson's girlfriend, and no allegation that Johnson submitted to McPhee's request. Additionally,
McPhee denies making the statements attributed to him by Johnson. (R. Vol. I, p. 195, deposition
p. 93,11.14-19).
The second cause of action alleged that McPhee was a principal of JCAV, and that Johnson
I

was a licensed real estate agent who represented McPhee and JCAV, LLC, as a customer in the
acquisition of land for a man-made lake referred to as "Radiant Lake Estates." He alleged that
McPhee had an oral contract to pay Johnson a real estate commission and that, therefore, McPhee
and JCAV breached a contract with Johnson. Johnson also alleged he was paid $4,000.00, from a
business account held jointly with "Jack VanderWaal, a k a . JCAV, LLC" and McPhee. (R. Vol. I,
p. 111).
The third cause of action alleges that JCAV, LLC was negligent by disregarding a request
by Johnson that a conversation between Johnson and the principal of JCAV, LLC remain
I
I
I

confidential, and by failing to make a reasonable investigation of allegations of "sexually charged
harassment" of Johnson by McPhee., and that JCAV breached its duty to pay Johnson which caused
Johnson agony and physical and mental injury. (R. Vol. I, p. 112).

I
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The relationship of the parties dated to 2002. It is undisputed that Johnson was paid a
commission when he was licensed as a real estate agent, for assisting in the sale of property owned
by JCAV on Government Way in Kootenai County by JCAV in 2003.

(R. Vol. I, p. 141,

Deposition pp. 14-15, 11.15-10). Subsequently, McPhee conceived of the idea of a housing
development surroundinga man made lake to be used for water skiing (the "Radiant Lake" project).
Johnson's assistance was minimal. (R. Vol. I, p. 141, Deposition pp. 15-16). The property was
eventually purchased by JCAV and Johnson's contractual claim is for a commission to be paid by
JCAV or McPhee when the property was purchased by JCAV. (R. Vol. I, pp. 55-56, p. 144,
Deposition p. 27). Johnson's claim for negligence against JCAV arises because when Johnson asked
the principal of JCAV, Jack VanderWaal, to investigate McPhee and to intervene and insure
payment, JCAV did not heed his request. (R. Vol. I, p. 185, Deposition pp. 105-106). Johnson
admitted that he would not have brought this action if he had been paid a commission by JCAV, the
purchaser of the Radiant Lake property. (R. Vol. I, p. 184, Deposition p. 100).
The District Court ruled that the words and acts of McPhee were not actionable, that because
there was no written agency agreement Johnson could not enforce his alleged oral agreement, and
that because of the legal requirement that a real estate agency agreement must be in writing, the
partial payment of sums did not create an enforceable agreement. (Tr. Pp. 62-73).
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IV. ARGUMENT
A. Summarv Judgment Standard.
It goes without saying that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue
of material fact after the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits have been construed most
favorably to the opposing party and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Boise Car and Truck Rental Company v Waco, i n c , 108 Idaho 780, 702 P.2d 818 (1985).
Additionally, in the case of Dunnick v Elder, 126 Idaho 308,882 P.2d 1475 (1994), the court cited
with approval the seminal Supreme Court case of Celotex v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,106 S. Ct. 2548,
91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The moving party in amotion for summaryjudgment is required to make

aprima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. If the burden of persuasion at trial
would be on the nonmovingparty then the party moving for summaryjudgment can satisfy its burden
of production in either of two ways. It can submit evidence that negates an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim or, it can demonstrate that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient
to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. "Either way, however, the moving
party must affirmativelydemonstrate there is no evidence in the record to support ajudgment for the
nonmoving party." Celotex vs. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 332, 106 S.Q. at 2557.

. . .[WJhere the evidentiary facts are undisputed and the trial court rather than a jury
will be the trier of fact, "summary judgement is appropriate, despite the possibility
of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences." First Security Bankv. Murphy, I3 1 Idaho 787,
790, 964 P.2d at 657 (citing Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho
515,519 n.l,650 P.2d 657,661 n. 1 (1982)).

I
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Because the burden is on JCAV to affirmatively:demonstrate the lack of evidence necessary
for Johnson to prevail, substantial excerpts of Johnson's deposition testimony will be published in
this brief because Johnson's admissions show the lack of evidence.
From Johnson's deposition:
81

6

Q. Okay. Tell me exactly what Mike McPhee did

7 that you found objectionable.

i

I

8

A. He told me to suck his dick, first of all.

9

Q.Olay.

I0

A. Then he -- over the -- over the month, every

11 time we were alone, he'd make some gesture to beckon me
12 in that -- in, you know -- he just -- he wouldn't let
13 it die.

Q. What gesture --

14

15

'

A. He tortured --

16

Q. What gesture would he make?

17

A. He would lick his lips and look down at

18 his -- look at me, lick his lips and look down at his

19 crotch. He would slurp. He would --just --just
20 sickening, like, you know ...
to tell me.
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A. He -- (uttering) -- would make a noise like

22

23 that. One time I smacked my lips because they were dry

24 or whatever. I'd been sitting in his car. And I did
25 something -- (uttering) -- some kind of smacking noise,
83
1 and he imitated it -- (uttering)-- and, you know,

-- it was like a constant -- I don't want to say

2 just

3 constant, but it was -- it just -- he wouldn't let it
4 die.

5

Q. So over the course of this one month that

6 you've alleged here in your complaint, how many days
7 did Mike McPhee do something to you that you found
8 objectionable?

9

A. Probably eight.

10

Q. Eight days out of the month?

11

A. (Nodding.)

12

Q. Is that correct?

13

A. (Nodding.)

14

Q. You have to answer out loud.

15

A. Yes.

16
,

,

.

Q. So when Mike McPhee, according to your
__ __.. . . .
.
.._.
..

.
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~~

~

~

,

.

.. ..~ ~. . ~ . ...

17 testimony, allegedly asked you to suck his dick, did

18 you tell Mike, You know, Mike, I don't want you to
19 speak to me that way?
20

A. No. I just froze and pretended it wasn't

21 happening basically.
22

Q. Okay. But over the course of the next month,

23 you would get up -- and at least eight times during
24 that month, you would get up, leave your house and go
I

I

25 to see Mike?
84

I

1

A. Pretty -- yeah, you could say it that way.

2 We were doing business.
3

Q. So how is it that you were so paralyzed that

4 you were able to get out of bed?
5

A. Paralyzed in a just momentary -- momentarily

6 paralyzed.

7

Q. So you knew these things were happening to

8 you, correct?
9

A. Correct.

10

Q. You knew you didn't like it, correct?

11

A. Correct.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, JCAV PAGE 7

12

Q. But, yet, you continued to put yourself in

13 the position that let it happen again?
14

A. I just couldn't believe he'd keep doing it.

15 Like I say, he wouldn't let it die. It was like, Okay;
16 you wanted me to suck your dick and I didn't; so that's
17 it; forget it.
18

Q. But you never told Mike that you didn't like

19 that kind of talk?
20

A. Well, no. That's just -- it's obvious

21 somebody doesn't like that.
85

3

Q. So then after that one-month period ended,

4 there was no longer any sort of alleged conduct from

5 Mr. McPhee relative to sexual harassment; is that
6 correct?
7

A. The "bend over and I'll drive" on the golf

8 course occurred in the summer. So I believe that

9 happened in a -- in -- you know, it may not have been
10 within that month. And I don't recall exactly where
1I that fell in, but it was -- it was the final hammer
12 basically.
.
. .- .. .... -- BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, ICAV: PAGE 8

13

Q. Well, let's look at your complaint.

14 Paragraph 6, as I have numbered it, says, "As a further
15 proximate result of defendant Milte McPhee maliciousIy

16 and repeatedly, over a period of about one month,
17 directing Jay Johnson to perform oral sexual action,
18 directing Jay Johnson by discreet gestures and sounds
I9 from his lips and mouth to perform oral sexual action;
20 and directing Jay Johnson to bend over and let Mike

21 McPhee drive, and telling Jay Johnson that Mike McPhee
I

22 would copulate with Jay Johnson's girlfriend."

I
I

All of that, as alleged in your complaint,

23

I

I

24 occurred within that one month, correct?

I

25

I

A. The punctuation and the language, no.

I

1 It's -- the -- in the month is the perfom oral sex
2 action, lips and gestures.

3

Q. Okay. And then tell me -- you say that

4 allegedly Mr. McPhee told you to bend over and let
5 Mr. McPhee drive. When did that happen?

6

.

I
I

I

A. That happened in the summer of 2003.
What month?
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8

A. I'm going to guess ...

9

Q. I don't want you to guess. I want --

10

A. I don't know.

11

Q. Okay. If you don't know, just say you don't

12 know.
13

A. I don't know.

14

Q. Okay. And you don't know what month it was

15 that these other allegations allegedly occurred, do
16 you?
17

A. Not precisely, no.

18

Q. All you know is in the spring of 2003,

19 correct?
20

A. Correct.

21

Q. Okay. And what about the next phrase there,

22 telling Jay Johnson that Mike McPhee would copulate
23 with Jay Johnson's girlfriend. When do you allege that
24 occurred?
25

A. That occurred in a phone call. Mike had been

87
1 golfing with me --

2
..

Q. When did it occur?

~
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.

-

..

..~.

,~....

~

''.

3

A. I don't recall exactly when it occurred.

4

Q. Okay. What year did it occur?

5

A. That is in -- it's -- 2002 is probably when

6 that occurred.
7

Q. Okay.

8

A. And I -- but I don't recall because it's

9 all -- I know that it was in my head that he said that.
10 And it was after he golfed with my girlfriend and ...
11

Q. Okay.

12

A. In Washington in a, you know' ...

13

Q. So this happened in the state of Washington?

14

A. He called from -- he was on the phone in

15 Washington, talking to me, and he said that.

16

Q. And you believe that to be in the year 2002,

17 correct?
A. I believe it was. But I, you know, don't --

18

19 1just -- if I could find out when he golfed with my
20 girlfriend, Nanci, that -- it occurred after that.

Q. Then you're saying in combination with this

21

22 statement that Mr. McPhee allegedly would copulate with
23 your girlfriend, that Mr. McPhee described his
~

,,.,

....

~

~

.

~
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.-. .

.

~. , .~..

~..

.~

24 genitalia to you?
25

A. Yes.
88

1

Q. Is that the same conversation?
.

.

2

A. Yes.

3

Q. Which you believe to be in 2002?

4

A. Yes.

5

Q. And then you say subsequently in the presence

6 of Jay Johnson asking Jay Johnson's girlfriend where

7 her bedroom was. Is that in 2002 also?

8

A. No. That was summer of 2003.

9

Q. What month?

10

A. Don't know.

11

Q. And then you go on to say during the course

12 of the dispute in the real estate transaction, that
13 Mr. McPhee basically tormented you as to the

14 performance of your duties in that transaction?
15

A. Correct.

16

Q. And when was that?

17

A. That was in summer of 2003.

18

Q. What month?
. ~ . . ..

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, JCAV: PAGE 12

- -~

19

A. It was over a period of probably two months.

,

20 And I don't have the documentation in front of me, but
21 it was starting on the day that the transaction was
22 supposed to close or within a week of that day. And
23 that's on the timeline, I think. And I gave my -- all
24 my documents ...
25

Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as -- I'm

1 handing you what's previously been marked as Deposition

I

I

2 Exhibit No. 1 to your previous deposition. Do you

I

3 recognize that document?
I
I

4

A. Yes.

5

Q. You drafted that?

6

A. Yes,

7

Q. Does that help refresh your recollection as

8 to when this tormenting --

i

,

9

A. May --

10

Q. -- as you've called it --

11

A. May2003.

12

Q. May 2003. Okay.

(R. Vol. 1, Pp.192-194, Deposition of Jay Johnson, Feb 14,2006 by Ian Smith.)
_ _ . . - . .. . - - - -- -

_,I__,,_.,,__I_.,_._..__^I_..___
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~

^

The portions of Johnson's testimony in bold print are emphasized to show that Johnson took
no steps to register his objection to McPhee's language. I-Iis inactivity is important because one can
draw an inference that at the time the acts complained of took place they were not so outrageous.
The allegations of infliction of emotional distress in the original complaint occurred between
February and July of 2003. (R. Vol. I, p. 200, Deposition Exhibit 1, a part of the Deposition of
Curtis Jay Johnson taken February 14,2006,11:25 a.m. constitutes a time line of "abuse" prepared
by Johnson in his own handwriting).
I

I
I

I

Johnson was allowed to amend his complaint to add subsequent acts which would not be
excluded by the statute of limitations. The acts which caused the emotional distress in 2005 are set
forth in a subsequent deposition of Johnson:
91
25 Q. How many times did Mr. McPhee talk to you in
92
1 the year 2005?
2

A. Probably ten.

3

Q. Ten times. Okay. And were those in person

4 or on the phone?

5

A. Half and half.

6

Q. Okay. And in the phone conversations, did

7 you ever call Mr. McPhee?
-8 ...... . ~.- q - . ~
ink-I-di&-oncvor-twi
h
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............

9

Q. All right. And so tell me exactly what

10 Mr. McPhee said during any ofthese telephone
11 conversations that was taunting.
12

A. You deranged motherfucker; no one will

13 believe you; you're crazy; you're a fly on my ass; we

14 don't have to pay you.
15

Those are the ones that come right to the top

16 ofmy mind.

Q. And would you say that those also are what

17

18 you would allege to be harassment?
19

A. Yes.

20

Q. And abuse?

21

A. Yes.
105

13 Q. And then on the last page on July -- or
14 excuse me -- paragraph 24, you allege that Mr. McPhee

15 caused a threatening altercation with you in the Iron
16 Horse Bar on July 22nd, 2006?
17

A. Yes.

18

Q. What were you doing at the bar?

19

_

,A. At the time, I was standing against the wall.
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20

Q. Did you buy any alcoholic beverages at the

21 bar that night?
22

A. No.

23

Q. How long had you been there?

24

A. How long had I been there?

25

Q. How long were you at the bar total on
106

1 July 22nd, 2006?

2

A. Probably three hours.

3

Q. And tell me what happened relative to

4 Mr. McPhee.

5

A. First of all, I was on the dance floor,

6 dancing, and he was. And I flipped him off. And then

7 1don't know if he saw it or not, because 1 didn't look
8 at him. And then 10 or 15 minutes later, 1 was

9 standing against the wall, resting. And he came up and
10 got right in my face. And I was pinned against a wall,
11 and there he was, and he was --

12

Q. Did he touch you?

13

A. Re did.

14

Q. When he, quote, got in your face?
~
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15

A. Not immediately, no.

16

Q. So when you say he got in your face, tell me

17 what that means.
18

A. He stood within six inches nose to nose.

19

Q. Okay. And then what happened?

20

A. Then he started -- and I can't listen to him

21 because it -- I won't listen to him. But he started
22 blah-blah speaking. And I said, Get out of my face or
23 I'll put your teeth down your throat.
24

And he said whatever he said. And I said,

25 You have no right to be in my space. And he stayed in
107

1 my space. So I pushed him away. I called him a puke
2 and a rapist. And he grabbed my wrist after I pushed

3 him away and looked me in the eyes with the -- sort of,

4 you know, what I've kind of tried to say but nobody

5 will understand -- or everybody refuses to understand.
6 He looked to me in a demonic possession-type look and

7 said, Don't fuck with me.
8

Q. And then what happened?

9

A. Then I shook my wrist free, and I walked
__I_

-.___--
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10 away. He started talking again. But I just walked
I 1 away. (Emphasis supplied)

(R. Vol. I, p. 198, Deposition pp. 106-107, Deposition of Curtis Jay Johnson, Taken on Behalf of
the Defendant Milce McPhee ).

B. Most Allegations Regarding Intentional and Nepli~entInfliction of Emotional
Distress are Barred by the Statute of Limitations.
To clarify the allegations of the complaint, the dates the events occurred must be determined.
The intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress alleged in the first complaint tookplace
at an earlier time, in 2003, more than two years before the filing of the complaint December 7,2005,
and are barred by the statute of limitations, I.C. $5-219. The District Court agreed in its ruling on
the motion for summary judgment (Tr. P.62,11. 17-23).
Johnson, realizing that his allegations were time barred, received permission to amend the
complaint to allege the additional acts which allegedly occurred closer in time to the filing of the
complaint. Those are the acts set forth on pages fifteen through eighteen of this brief
C. Intentional or Neglipent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Was the conduct extreme and outrageous?
Johnson's Complaint states: "Defendant, Mike McPhee's conduct was intentional and
malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiff to suffer humiliation, mental anguish, and
emotional and physical distress." (R. Vol. I, p. 95, 2"* Paragraph.)

1

InIdaho, "an action for intentional inflictionof emotional distress will lie only where
~he*eis_extremmeanddo~ttageo~~~ond~t~o~p1edd~i~-sexe~e-emoti.ona1..di.~tr1:~~~
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Walston v. Monumental LifeIns. Co., 129 Idaho 21 1,219,923 P.2d 456,464 (1996)
(quoting Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735,'741,682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Ct.App.1984)).
To prevail on this cause of action a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly; (2) that the defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) that there was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiffs emotional distress; and (4) that the plaintiffs emotional distress
was severe. Svence v. Howell. 126 Idaho 763.774.890 P.2d 714.725 (1995): Pavne
v, Wallace, 156 Idaho 303,306,32 P.3d 695: 698'(~t.A~~.2001);
~ a ; i s ,106 Idaho
at 741,682 P.2d at 1288.
Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 132 P.3d 1261,1267-1268 (2006), (Ct. App.2006)
For the purposes of this argument, JCAV assumes that McPhee made the statements. Thus,
the first issue presented is whether the conduct complained of was of such a nature that a remedy
exists: "Idaho law requires, in order to obtain damages for emotional distress, very extreme conduct.
I

Additionally, the conduct must be intentional or reckless, the conduct must be extreme and
outrageous, there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional
distress and the emotional distress must be severe." Edmondson 11. Shearer Lumber Products, 139
Idaho 172,75 P.3d 733 (2003).
It is interesting to note that the instances where McPhee allegedly caused Johnson emotional
distress were initiated by Johnson: The instance where McPhee "got in his face." The deposition
transcript shows that Johnson initiated the contact and used foul language himself. That fact gives
additional credence to the inference that the foul language and conduct was not extreme, because it
was a response to similaf language and gestures by Johnson. Even though the acts may have been
rough or crude, but they were not so extreme and outrageous as to be considered anything other than
ordinary locker room or "guy" talk. If crude language exchanged between two adult males were
--~..

I

I

I
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actionable the system of justice in this country would grind to a halt. And if one of the parties to the
language didn't appreciate the crudeness of the language the proper response was to leave the
relationship, or to complain, neither of which happened, at least for two years, as will be shown
below.
In Brown v Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371 (1985), the Court, citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts stated:
The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in
the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to
a certain amount of rough language and to occasional acts that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case
where one's feelings are hurt.
The words and acts alleged, which took place in 2003, were in the context of a commercial
relationship between Johnson and McPhee. In another case where an alleged breach of contact was
alleged to have caused emotional distress this Court stated:
Life in the competitive commercial world has at least equal capacity to bestow ruin
as benefit, and it is presumed that those who enter this world do so willingly,
accepting the risk of encountering the former as part of the cost of achieving the
latter. Absent clear evidence to the contrary we will not presume that the parties to
acontract suchas the one beforeus meant to insure eachother's emotional tranquility.
Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 848,606 P.2d 944,952
(1980).
Even Johnson essentially admitted that the conduct was not extreme or outrageous.

20 And he said, Fuck you, you're a fly on my

21 ass; you're a piece of shit; blip, blip, blah, blah,
I

I

22 and blip, blip, blah, blah, blah. As bad as you can
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
u
.
-

I
i
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_

23 treat somebody.
24

Q. You've been saying those words all along all

25 today through this deposition. It's okay for you to
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1 say them, but it's not okay for Mike to say them?
2

A. To say those words? No, I didn't say those

3 words.
4

Q. You've been saying fuck and frigging and --

5

A. No, it isn't --

6

Q. --bad words --

7

A.

-- that he said those words -- it isn't that

8 he said those words; it's the way he treated me. It's
9 a -- it's the emotional --

I
i

I

10

Q. Okay. I understand what you're saying.

11

A.

-- connection ... (Emphasis supplied).

1

(R. Vol. I, p. 186, Deposition pp. 108-109)

i

Even during the argument on the motion for summary judgement. His argument
contained the following statement:
"And at this state, it's like, okay, here's this guy [McPhee] who is super nice, this guy is asking
me to suck dick, it's like, I had a good friend in college who was gay. Okay? And I've had other
people make propositions to me that way. I'm a little bit of an effeminate man, because I'm an
artsy type of guy, and men sometimes take that-and I'm a kind of person- and men have taken
that to mean- you know? So I can understand McPhee." (Tr. P. 31. 11. 11-20).
Some examples of conduct considered extreme were cited in Alderson v. Bonner, supra,

_
!

and are set forth in bold below for ease of reading^._
~
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However one defines what,personscan expect from society it is
plain that courts have required very extreme conduct before
awarding damages for the intentional infliction of enlotional
distress. See, ee.g.,Blakeley v. Skortal's Estate, 236 Iowa 787,20
N.W.2d 28 (1945) (defendant's decedent committed suicide in
plaintiffs kitchen); Hill v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 154 Tenn. 295,294
S.W. 1097 (1927) (mutilation of dead body); Boyle v. Chandler,
138 A. 273 (Del.Sup.1927) (removal of body from casket); Price
v. Yellow Pine Paper Mill Co., 240 S.W. 588 (Tex.Civ.App.1922)
(plaintiff's husband brought home in severely injured
condition without warning); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Rock, 160
Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1 931) (wrapping up a dead rat in place of a
loaf of bread for a sensitive customer); Bielitski v. Obadiak, 61
Dom. L. Rep. 494 (1921) (spreading false rumor that plaintiffs
son had hanged himself).
The outrageousness that will justify liability under this tort is
illustrated in a number of Idaho cases, including Walston, 129
Idaho 21 1,923 P.2d 456 (insurance company's unfair dealings
with a grieving widower); Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598,850
P.2d 749 (1993) (prolonged physical, mental, and sexual abuse);
Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho 1137,695 P.2d 1276 (Ct.App.1985)
(recklessly shooting and killing a donkey that was both a pet
and a pack animal); Spence, 126 Idaho 763,890 P.2d 714 (real
estate developers swindling a family out of their "life long
dream").

Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 132 P.3d 1261,1268 (Ct. App.2006)
A case where the conduct was not considered to be extreme was Payne v. Wallace, 136
Idaho 303,32 P.3d 695 (belligerent yelling of profanities in presence of a child after an
automobile accident), although in that case it was the severity of injuries which were determined
not to be extreme.

D. The District Court's Role as a Gatekeeper
In a tort of this nature the court is the gate-keeper of whether this matter should go to the
jury at all. The court in Edmondson cited with approval the Restatement of Torts:

_

_

It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is
for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the
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particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result
in liability.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 55 46 comment h (1965).

Edmondson v Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 180,75 P.3d 733,741 (2003).
The District Court exercised its role when it determined that "for this Court to come to
the conclusion that this would support an action for intentional infliction or negligent infliction
of mental distress or emotional distress would leave the Court to pretty much open the door to
any type of locker room comment or vulgar discussion between people. . . . While it is certainly
not pretty language or comfortable language, 1don't think it rises to the level of outrageousness
that the statute or that the cause of action requires under our law." (Tr. P.66 LL6-18).

E. No Proximate Cause
Was there a causal connection between the injury complained of and the damage?
In his deposition Johnson recounts instances of his own behavior, including committing
adulteq, which brought community reprobation. Johnson testified: "So I was egotistical and in
people's face in contrary to societal standards. And because I was that way, over months of time
people started to judge me negatively, whatever...I was in a weak and vulnerable condition at the
time." (R. Vol. I, p. 154, Depo. of Jay Johnson p. 16) . . . "And when things got rough for me, in
the very beginning of this trauma- there is no beginning, really, and there is probably no end, but
one of the most important initial things that happened was, I seduced a woman in a listing, that I
had in Coeur d'Alene." (R. Vol. I, p. 155, Depo, of Jay Johnson, p. 18). "And I concocted a
story, the woman supported my story. I lied, I ceased to exist, I died in a sense of I had to live
with that lie in Century 21 for six months". (R. Vol. I, p. 155, Depo. of Jay Johnson, p. 19).
--.-..-,.-.p-.-

..-_II._.,_.-

I
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10 Q. Why didn't you go to work -- get a different
11 job?

12

A. I was disabled.

13

Q. Don't tell me words; tell me why you didn't

14 go to work.
15

A. Because I was fried. I couldn't -- my

16 nerves -- I had no nerves whatsoever. Everywhere I
17 went, people said he's a stalker, he's a sex offender,
18 he's a frigging freak. And everywhere I went, no
19 matter what, everybody thought I was a freak.
20

Q. How do you know what other people thought?

21

A. Because they frigging tell me. It's all

22 around town.

19 Q. You divorced your wife in 2002?
20

A. She divorced me. Correct.

21

Q. Shc divorced you. Why did she divorce you?

22

A. She told me if I bought a boat she would

23 divorce me. I bought a boat. She divorced me.
69
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13 it?
14

A. No. I cried. Mostly over the kids. *

**

69
23 Q. So that would have been from 2002 to 2004?

24

A. Correct.

25

Q. And then what happened?

70
1

A. Then I ran out of money and went crazy. * * *

76
2 1 Q. And how do those people know that you were
22 a -- that you -- that they thought you were a sex
23 offender and child molester? How do you think that
24 happened?
25

A. Because I've described in my affidavit that I

77

1 stood by the dance floor, which was uncommon in America
2 but it was very common in Germany where I lived ibr two
3 and a half years. And I had a mission where I was

4 going to study human nature, because I thought human
5 nature was distorted and that's why our society was
-6--distorted~-BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, JCAV PAGE 25

--

--

7

And I was just going to learn about people.

8 And I was going to do that by watching them as they
9 made mating-type gestures and movements and watched
10 the -- you know, watch the little things that they -11 and I did that from the side of the dance floor. I
12 felt comfortable standing on the side of the dance
13 floor. But people weren't comfortable with me standing
14 there because they don't do that in America as much.
15

And so it was a habit of mine that I didn't

16 even think about. It was normal for me. But then,
17 say, 500 people saw me standing there and thought that
I

18 guy is weird, but they didn't know why or anything.

I

19 But then once my eyes got crazy from post-traumatic
20 stress disorder, that guy is frigging stalking people.
21

Q. How did your eyes get crazy? They don't look

22 crazy to me.

I

23

A. They're -- I've --

24

Q. Who says your eyes are crazy?

25

A. They were.

I

I
I
1
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2

A. I could, yeah.

3

Q. I can't see it.

4

A. I loolted like a frigging monster.

5

Q. You don't look like a monster to me.

6

A. I looked like a frigging -

7

Q. Oh, you don't now?

8

A.No.

9

Q. Okay.

10

A. Not usual -- sometimes though.

11

Q. You're better now then?

12

A. I'm better. But I sure as hell still --

13

Q. Then you're cured?

14

A. No, no, no.

15

Q. You don't look like a monster.

16

A. So I must be cured.

17

Q. You go around staring at people?

18

A. I've been accused of that even very recently.

19

Q. So why do you do it then?

1

20

A. Because I'm frozen in a psychological state

1

21 of frigging trauma.

)
I

..

-22-Q-TVliiFjyo-y
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do you stare at peopleTI-'------

.

23

A. Because I don't know what the fuck to think.

24 And I look and I -- and my whole mind was so frigging
25 shattered that when I would look at a person I wouldn't

79
1 know what to think. Because so many people hated me
2 and poured so much hatred into me because of the sex

3 offender-type thing, that I walked around being hated

4 and ostracized and condemned for a year.
5

Every single person in town that I had any --

6 that had any knowledge of me -- psycho sex offender.

7 So you'd endure that. Thrown out of a coffee shop.
8 Thrown out of a disco. Frigging starbucks, every

9 morning everybody is looking at me like I'm a frigging
10 fieak. I can get plenty of people to testify to that.
II

12

Q. That's got to be tough.

And then you took pictures of kids, right, at

13 Funtastics?
14

A. Correct.

15

Q. And people there -- that started a rumor that

16 you were a child molester?
i7---K~Tt%ecame a r u r n o r t t i 5 i f I ~ ~ i l T f - - - ~
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18 molester.
19

Q. Because of that?

20

A. Because of that.

21

Q. So that must have been distressing?

22

A. Yes.

23

Q. And then not getting paid, that must have

24 been distressing?

25

1

A. Yes.

Q. And then you wanted to raise money from Jack

2 VanderWaal for this project that you were -- that you
3 were putting together. Nettybrook I think you called
4 it, right?
5

A. Yes.

6

Q. And you couldn't raise money for that?

7

A. Correct.

8

Q. So that must have been distressing?

9

A. Correct.

(R. Vol. I, pp. 176, 178, 179, Deposition of Curtis Jay Johnson, Taken on Behalf of the
Defendant Mike McPhee pp. 67-80).
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Johnson asked the court to award him damages because of McPhce's alleged comments.
But he did not show a connection between the acts of McPhee and Johnson's alleged condition.
Johnson assessed his low self-esteem to be a result of a combination of factors: his adulterous
relationships and his lies. I-Ie stared at people, in an inappropriate manner, was thrown out of
business establishments, thought that others considered him to be a child molester, and couldn't
raise money for real estate projects. It was reasonable for the District Court to infer that any
emotional distress which may have been be suffered by Johnson was caused by Johnson's own
acts which had "no beginning" and "no end." There is no evidence other than Johnson's own
assertions, that the acts of McPhee were the proximate cause of damages to Johnson.

F. Liability of Principal for Acts of his Aeent
Even if the court finds that McPhee's words were the proximate cause which somehow
caused Johnson's emotional distress, the acts of McPhee cannot be imputed to JCAV. It should
be noted that all of the acts alleged took place in the context of Johnson demanding to be paid for
a real estate transaction, the purchase of property by JCAV.
A principal is liable for the torts of an agent committed within the scope of the
aeencv relationshiu. Bailev v. Ness. 109 Idaho 495.497.708 P.2d 900.902
(T985j; ~estatemint(~ec6nd)of Agency $5 251 (1958j." Sharp v. W'HMoore,
Inc., 118 Idaho 297,303,796 P.2d 506,512 (Idaho,1990)

In this case there was no showing that JCAV authorized or ratified the alleged statements of
McPhee which occurred when Johnson initiated contacts to seek payment from McPhee, who
was not a purchaser of the property. There has been no showing that JCAV even knew about the
statements allegedly made by McPhee until the phone call ffom Johnson to JCAV which is the
basis for Johnson's third claim for relief.
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G. No Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires a duty, a breach of that duty
and the manifestation of a physical injury caused by the conduct. See Brown v. Matthews

Moutuauy, Inc. 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37 (1990). In that case, which involved mishandling a
dead body the court stated, "Plaintiffs must still prove all of the elements of negligence and
damages in order to recover. The mere fact that mishandling of a body has occurred does not
automatically entitle plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional distress." 1 18 Idaho at 837-838.
The arguments previously made apply to this tort as well. First, the District Court held
that the words and acts were not actionable. Secondly, the emotional harm complained of by
Johnson cannot be shown to be proximately caused by McPhee. One can easily infer the harm, if
any, was a result of the reaction of others to Johnson's own strange behavior. The allegations of
harm which occurred in 2005 and 2006 were not negligently caused by McPhee because, Johnso~l
admitted that McPhee was not even aware of the "emotional distress" which he had caused two
years earlier. There was no showing that McPhee was aware that his actions caused harm
especialIy in light of Johnson's demand for money, as shown below, and Johnson's instigation of
confrontation with McPhee.

I

22

Q. You never told Mike that you didn't like him

23 making those noises, did you?
24
!

.

1

A. No. I did in -- and he obviously knew I

25 didn't like it.
.-
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1

Q. You never told him that, did you?

2

A. No.
92

22

Q. Are there any other statements that you

23 allege Mr. McPhee made in 2005 that -24

A. He said, Why would I want you to suck my

25 dick; there's plenty of women that want to suck my

93
1 dick.
2

Q. Did you mention to Mr. McPhee that he had

3 said something to that effect allegedly? I mean, how
4 did that statement come about?

5

A. Because I had told him that I told Jack

6 VanderWaal and I had just

-- I said I frigging - I had

7 told him -- in 2005 I went in his office and I said,
8 Mike, you know, that really fucked me up when you asked
9 me to suck my dick. He says, I don't know what you're
I0 talking about.
11

Q. So this is two years after this allegedly

12 took place, right, because you testified that --

13

A. Correct. I was trying to heal.

14

Q. So for two years you didn't let -- and this

15 is just an allegation that you've claimed that
16 Mr. McPhee has made this statement. We don't -.
,
A
,
"
-

17

A. Yes.

18

Q X E d s t believe it at a
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19

A. Right, right, right, right.

20

Q. But at any rate, for two years you let this

21 statement just kind of rattle around in your brain; is
22 that right?
23

A. Yes, you could say.

24

Q. And for two years after McPhee allegedly said

25 it, it took you two years to tell him you didn't like

94

I it; is that right?
2

A. Correct.
(R. Vol. I, p. 193,195 Deposition pp. 84-85,93-94 ).
The cumulative inference that the District Court reasonably drew from Johnson's

testimony was that the words and conduct complained of were not outrageous because Johnson
admitted that McPhee did not know he had made the remarks of which Johnson now complains.

H. The Contract Claim
The events which gave rise to the contract claim are as follows:
Johnson further testified:
"

42

7 A. I was directed to find a piece of

8 property and make a deal happen where we would build
9 a lake, by Mike [McPhee].
10

Q. And when did that happen?

11

A. Approximately the spring of 2004.

12

Q. No, when --
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13

A. No, I'm sorry, he told me to find a piece

14 of property, it had to be late 2003 because by
15 spring of 2004 we actually had a piece of property
16 and we actually were negotiating contracts.

17

Q. And was that the piece of property that

18 was purchased by JCAV?
19

A. Yes.

20

Q. Do you have a legal on that?

21

A. I do not.

22

Q. Do you have a signed earnest money on

23 that?
24

A. No.

25

Q. So you weren't involved with the purchase

43
1 of that?
2

A. That's correct, not in contract, but in

3 spirit and heart, yes, absolutely positively, which
4 is why we are here."
(R. Vol. I, p. 148, Deposition pp. 42-43).
The certified copies received from the Idaho Real Estate Commission show that on January 5,
2005, Johnson was not a licensed real estate agent. (R. Vol 11, p.253). The contract for the sale
of the parcels of property in question was executed on January 5,2005. (R. Vol 11, p. 203). The
contract for sale of the second parcel was executed by the purchaser, JCAV, on'the same date.
(R. Vol 11, p.218). Johnson was not licensed on that date and is not entitled to commission on
that basis alone, because an individual must be licensed as a real estate agent to be entitled to a
commission. I.C. $54-2002.
.-
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I . No Actual Authority. No Signed Agreement.
No agency relationship in a regulated real estate transaction can be created orally or by
implication without a written agreement. I.C. $54-2084. A regulated real estate transaction is
one governed by Title 54, Chapter 20, Idaho Code. I.C. $54-2083(12). Governed transactions
include "any single act described within the definitions of 'real estate broker."' I.C. $54-2002.
Real estate broker is defined broadly. It includes "any person" who takes part in the procuring of
prospects, or the negotiating or closing of any sale or exchange of real estate, or interest in real
estate, or business opportunity for others. I.C. $54-2004(29).
From Johnson's deposition:
9 Q. What work did do you as a licensed real
10 estate agent relative to Radiant Lake Estates?
11
1

j

A. I selected the location and organized the

12 buyer and seller to negotiate terms.
13

Q. So are you saying that your duty as a

14 licensed real estate agent is to select a location for
15 a buyer to purchase property?

16

A. To introduce the buyer to the seller

17 essentially, yes, on -- that owns the property. You
18 pick the property and introduce the buyer and seller.
( (R. Vol. I, p. 191 Deposition p. 77. Deposition of Curtis Jay Johnson ).

To the extent that Johnson's Complaint alleged that he represented JCAV in the
acquisition of land or a business opportunity, he was prohibited from doing so, because he was
not licensed. One cannot infer any type of agency relationship without a written agreement.
Idaho Code $54-2094 states:

". . . this act is intended to abrogate the common law of agency as it

!

!
I

applies to regulated real estate t r a n s a c t i o n ~ , 2 . . L f t h r P , i s n w ~ ~ U ~ ~ m
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agency relationship because the common law rule of agency, with respect to regulated real estate
transactions, has been abrogated. As admitted by Johnson, no such document exists.
8

Q. Did you ever have a signed listing

9 agreement, either as a buyer or a seller, with JCAV
10 after the sale of the property on 6600 Government
11 Way?
12

A. No."
(R. Vol. I, p. 140, Deposition p. 12).

He had no signed agreement with McPhee.
77
19 Q. In your representation of Mike McPhee and

I

20 JCAV as a licensed real estate agent, did you have a
21 written agreement of any sort?

I

22
I

A. No.

(R. Val. I, p. 191, Depo. of Jay Johnson, p. 77-78)
Representation agreements by a real estate agent must be in writing pursuant to Idaho Code
554-2050. Subsection 2 of 354-2050 addresses buyer representation agreements and sets forth the
terms which must be included in a buyer representation agreement, which include the fees or
commissions and the manner in which the fees or commissions will be paid. I.C. $54-2050(2)(c);
and (d). Johnson has admitted that no such written agreement existed. Without a written agreement
there can be no r e p r e s e ~ t a t h a r d ~ e s t a f . e i l g e ~ T f h i s q m x n t a l i o ~ - -

I
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agent, Johnson is not entitled to a fee. Also, I.C. $9-508, requires an agreement for a commission
or reward for the finding or procuring real estate, must be in writing and "signed by the owner of
such real estate, or his legal, appointed and duly qualified representative." I.C. $9-508 is a form of
statute of frauds applicable to a real estate broker employment agreement.

" 2 Q. Did you have a signed listing agreement?
3

A. No. I --just a promise --

4

Q. Did you talk about what the terms were?

5

A. There was no written -- it was just -- it was

6 a promise that isn't enforceable, and I realize that.
7

Q. Okay. So you're not suing for an

8 unenforceable promise?
9

A. No."
(R. Vol. I, p. 181, Deposition p. 87 ).

J. Part Performance
Johnson alleged that the doctrine of part performance allows him to recover, despite not
being licensed and despite the lack of a written agreement.
"The doctrines of equitable estoppel and part performance are viewed together. Under Idaho
law, part performance per se does not remove a contract from the operation of the statute of frauds.
Rather, '[tlhe doctrine of part performance is best understood as a specific form of the more general
principle of equitable estoppel.' " Swordv. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,92 P.3d 492,499 (2004) (quoting
t 7 - ~ - ~ 1 . % 5 ; - f o m 8 ; l j ~ 2 9 ~ ~ r . i%TrTTE7l-A p p .
1
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specifically enforced by operation of the doctrine of part performance, an oral agreement "must be
complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in
themselves of being reduced to certainty." Bear Island WaterAss'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,
723,874 P.2d 528, 534 (1994). Lettunich v. Key Bank Nut. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d
1104, 1109 (Idaho, 2005),
As the District Court stated, there is a specific real estate statute which requires a writing.
The Court is not free to amend the statute, "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not
construe it, hut simply follows the law as written. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112
Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987). Unless the result is palpably absurd, we must assume that the
legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298,715 P.2d 968
(1986). If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative,
not judicial." Hansen v. State firm Mut. Auto. Ins.' Co., 112 Idaho 663,735 P.2d 974 (1987). In

re Estate ofMiller 149 P.3d 840, 842 (Idaho,2006).
If "part performance" or equitable estoppel were to apply in this instance the court would
be abrogating the statute. If this result seems to be unjust, the power to correct it is legislative.

Lettunich v. Key Bank Nut. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362,367,109 P.3d 1104,1109 (Idaho,2005)

K. Neeli~encebv Disregarding a Reauest bv Johnson that a Conversation
Between Johnson and the Principal of JCAV. LLC Remain Confidential,
and hv Failing to Make a Reasonable Investigation of Allegations of
"SexuaIIv Charged Harassment" of Johnson bv McPhee
Johnson was not an agent of JCAV. On August 25,2005, as alleged in Johnson's Complaint,

~ h " p f i n c i p a t s f + F € % " d - d i d ~ aaconversarion
l
between himselt and Johnson.
I
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1 Q. Okay. So you called him. And what did you
2 talk about on the phone? What did you say to him?
3

A. I told him that I had not been paid properly,

4 that Mike had promised me that he -- and that he didn't
5 keep his promise and that he'd been very cruel to me
6 and that I was unable to talk to Mike anymore and I

7 needed to speak with Jack about getting paid for the
8 lake.
9

Q. Okay. And what did Jack say?

10

A. He took it under advisement. And I don't

11 recall exactly what he said. But he said he was going
12 to look into it.
13

Q. And then what happened?

14

A. And then I text messaged him.

15

Q. And what did you say in your text message?

16

A. Jack, can you please let me know status;

17 thanks; Jay.
18

Q. And did he respond to that?

19

A. I caHed him shortly thereafter.

20

Q. And what did you say to him?

21

A. And I just basically said, What's going on?

22 And he said that he had already paid me $4,000, that he

23 had his personal money involved in the project a lot
24 and he was steep and didn't have anymore, and that
25 there'd be plenty of money when the lots sold. And he
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1 told me Mike was thc guy who was going to be making all
2 the money, him and Lane.
3

He referred to some kind of commission

4 agreement, which has not been furnished in discovery,

5 but ...

6

Q. And did that distress you?

7

A. It -- I was beyond -- so, yes, it was

8 distressing that Jack wasn't going to help me. Yes.
9

Q. Okay. And so is that one of the reasons

10 you're suing him is because he wasn't going to help
11 you?
12

A. I'm including Jack [JCAV] in the lawsuit because he

13 had an obligation to pay me and he didn't. And then he
14 had an obligation or a duty to investigate my
15 allegations and he didn't.

16

Q. What was his obligation to pay you? Why did

17 he have an obligation to pay you?
18

A. Because of an oral contract made by his agent

19 and it's his project.
20

Q. What was the oral contract?

21

A. To pay me a commission for -- real estate

22 commission for the sale of the land -- for the purchase
23 oftheland.
(R. Vol. I, p. 179, Deposition p. 8 1- 82 ).
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The duty breached, one would surmise, would be a duty not to increase some readily apparent
harm to Johnson. It has been shown, however, that Johnson's alleged emotional condition cannot
be blamed on McPhee or JCAV, but on Johnson's own actions. Furthermore, JCAV could not have
had any knowledge that Johnson was distraught as aresult of McPhee, because Johnson had not even
informed McPhee that the comment he allegedly made had harmed him. Additionally, Johnson's
state of mind was his own doing. What was known was that Johnson asked JCAV for money and
was refused.
The essence of the lawsuit is that Johnson thought he should have been paid for work which
he did as a real estate agent for McPhee. This is not a breach of duty and is not actionable as a
negligence claim.
91

6 Q. Tell me where Jack VanderWaal breached any

7 duty that he had to you or that JCAV breached any duty
8 they had to you.
9

A. He didn't pay me. He didn't investigate my

10 allegations of torture and sexual abuse.
91
22 Q. You weren't tortured physically, right?
23

A. It became physical. But no --

24

Q. You said Mike touched you one time, he gently

25 touched your shoulder.
92
1

A. No. It became physical in my body.
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2

Q. So there wasn't any physical torture?

3

A.No.

4

Q. And was there any sex between you and Mike?

5

A. No.
98

13 Q. And then you continued the relationship with
14 Mike because you wanted to make more money, right?
15

A. The real estate project on the lake was worth

16 doing, yes. And it was -- I didn't discontinue my
17 friendship because, first of all, what you don't
18 understand is post-traumatic stress disorder takes
19 three to six months. When you -- when you -20

Q. What I understand is you didn't do anything

21 to mitigate your damages, did you?
22

A. I didn't realize how much it hurt me at the

23 time.
24

Q. Well, when did you realize --

25

A. I was just in denial. And Mike was a nice
99

1 guy.

2

Q. When did you realize how much you were

3 hurt?

4

A. When my project for the Fred Meyer deal died

5 and I had nothing left to do and no money. And I
6 realized I'm frigging done; I can't even function; my

7 mind's gone; I'm toast.
-d4WtW-
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9 know. I did not know that I had a mental illness, per
10 se, until I wallced into the State of Idaho Mental
11 Health Department the day after I filed -- or I think I
12 walked in a couple weeks before, but they had an
13 appointment, and I started to read what mental illness
14 is and what post-traumatic stress disorder was and I
15 was like, I have post-traumatic stress disorder.
16

Q. So you diagnosed that yourself?

17

A. Well, I -- it's pretty easy when everything

18 that's -- every single bullet item is exactly what you
19 went through.
99
20 Q. Okay. So the duty that JCAV breached is, to
21 you -- to you, according to what you're saying, is
22 because they didn't do what you wanted them to do,
23 correct? You wanted them to investigate sexual
24 harassment, right?

25

A. I didn't. I wanted them to pay me.
100

1

Q. Oh, so you're --their negligence was not

2 paying you; is that what you're saying?
3

A. They're under -- there's layers; the layer of

4 not paying me --

5

Q. Don't talk about layers. Just tell nle what

6 you're talking about.
7

A. They didn't pay me. If they had paid me, I'd

8 - - k a P & o u t - s - - ' 5
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9 dick.
8 Q. And you'd agree with me. So that doesn't
9 have to do with not investigating.
You're saying they were negligent because

10

11 they didn't investigate?
12

A. Correct.

13

Q. Okay. So how did that cause youdamages,

14 them not investigating?
15

A. Because I was left alone in a terrible

16 situation and had no -- even though I had done work, I

17 wasn't paid, and there was no -- there was no getting
18 paid.
19

Q. Oh, there was no getting paid. You didn't

20 have a written agreement?
21

A. There was no getting paid.
105

14 Q. They didn't do it. Okay. So how were you
15 damaged by them not investigating?
16

A. Because if he would investigate, he would

17 have found out that it was more than likely true and
18 then he could have taken a correct action -- a

19 reasonable action rather than a negligent one.
20

Q. And what's the correct action? What did you

21 want him to do?
22

A. Re should have paid me per my Letter.(Emphasis supplied).

f R - . ~ 1 ~ 8 3 ~ ; 1 - s s ; D ~ t i ~ ; 1 ~ 0 ~ ~ .
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, JCAV: PAGE 44

V. CONCLUSION
Johnson may have suffered some emotional traumas a result of his divorce; as a result of
staring at people and being thrown out of business establishments. Ile may have been traumatized
because people thought he was a sex offender. Ifthis is true, it may have been difficult to hold down
a job. He claims foul language caused him to be traumatized but for two years neglected to inform
the person who supposedly used the foul language that it was hurtful. And when he finally informed
McPhee that he has been hurt he also instigated confrontations.
Johnson claimed he was the real estate agent for McPhee and JCAV, but admitted that the
agreement was not in writing and was unenforceable.
He claimed JCAV was negligent but admitted that payment of the alleged real estate
commission would have resolved their negligence. Johnson has not stated a cause of action. No
evidence is available which can demonstrate the essential elements of any part of Johnson's claim,
even if the court considers all his allegations to be true, and draws all reasonable inferences in
Johnson's favor.
The Court should affirm the District Court's decisiongrantingJCAV's Motion for Summary
Judgment, that even if McPhee did the acts alleged, such acts do not and cannot constitute intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
The Court should affirm the District Court's decision granting JCAV's Motion for Summary
Judgment that Johnson was not entitled to a real estate commission without a written agreement.
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Finally, the Court should affirm the District Court's decision that Johnson's claims against
JCAV for negligence should be dismissed because no cause of action has been stated.
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